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Abstract
How has the transition to a market economy affected the relationship between
wages and productivity across different types of workers and firms? This paper
examines this question using unusually rich matched employer-employee data
from Slovenia over the 1992-2001 period. The findings include strong evidence
that 1.) state-owned firms overpaid their employees at the onset of transition, a
finding consistent with theoretical predictions on self-managed firms, 2.) older
workers have become relatively less productive, indicating a difficulty in
acquiring the skills demanded in a market economy, 3.) the relative wages of
workers across demographic characteristics such as gender, age and education
generally reflect their relative marginal productivity differentials.
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set the basis and motivation for the final chapter, in which I present my results. Note that
the scope of the paper is rather broad by necessity: in order to obtain unbiased estimates of
relative wage and productivity differentials across different types of firms (i.e. state-owned,
privatized, newly created, foreign owned), we need to account for differences in worker
quality across these different types of firms, which involves calculating the relative wage and
productivity differentials for different types of workers in the process. Conversely, in order
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ownership. The result is the proceeding analysis of wage and productivity differentials across
different types of workers and firms.
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Chapter I: Effects of Transition on Productivity and Wage Differentials
across Different Types of Firms
1.) Introduction
A defining part of the transition from a socialist to a market economy has been the
process of factor and product market liberalization (Krueger, 2004). During this process,
government intervention in what had previously been highly regulated spheres of economic
activity has been greatly curtailed, and market based allocation mechanisms have increasingly
been given free reign to govern economic activity. In the process, governments have
privatized previously state-owned firms, eliminated soft-budget constraints, liberalized
capital flows from abroad, abolished guaranteed job security, and deregulated the wage
determination process. The fundamental underlying belief behind these reforms has been
that market-based incentives will ultimately lead to long-term economic growth and will
correct the severe distortions inflicted by socialist planners.
A decade and a half after the onset of transition, it is clear that most countries have
overcome the initial difficulties inherent in the transition process. However, many
fundamental questions about the effects of market liberalization remain unresolved. For
example, how has privatization – a key ingredient in transition reforms – affected the wages
of workers working in different types of firms (e.g. private, de novo¸foreign-owned)? Are
workers in state-owned firms, which presumably have less efficient corporate governance
structures and managerial oversight, able to inflate their wages above what their marginal
revenue product would warrant? Have the different wage policies across these different
types of firms affected the composition of their workforces? If so, how does the total factor
productivity of different types of firms differ after we account for differences in labor quality
5
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across dimensions such as education, experience, and age? In other words, to what extent
has the transition process succeeded in reforming the previously dysfunctional incentive
regimes?
In this paper, I explore these questions empirically for a particular transition
economy: Slovenia. Using matched employer-employee data spanning the first ten years of
the transition period, I examine several aspects of the dynamic wage determination process. I
directly test a longstanding hypothesis regarding the behavior of workers in (formerly) selfmanaged firms which was first formulated by Ward (1958) – namely, that workers in selfmanaged firms appropriate a portion of the firms profit through wages that are higher, ceteris
paribus, than they would be in a profit-maximizing capitalist firm. I find strong support for
this hypothesis, as workers in state-owned firms early in transition are paid markedly higher
wages than workers in privately-owned firms even though they are considerably less
productive. I also find that as transition has progressed, competitive pressures have forced
the wage policies of state-owned firms to converge with those of private firms, as the wageproductivity gap decreases significantly between 1992 and 2001. Moreover, the performance
of privately-owned firms has consistently proven superior to state-owned ones: estimates of
labor-quality augmented production functions indicate that privatized, foreign-owned and
newly created firms are 14, 24, and 7 percent more productive than state-owned ones,
respectively.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, I describe the theoretical
background which motivates the empirical analysis and outline the previous empirical
research on the subject. Section 3 discusses the country-specific considerations of the study,
focusing first on the theory and empirical evidence on workers’ self-management and then
describing the institutional background in Slovenia since the collapse of socialism. (Note
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that the discussion of the methodology, actual data used and empirical results is relegated to
Chapter 3.)

2.) Theoretical background
Privatization, when accompanied by the appropriate institutional reforms, is a critical
aspect of the transition process because it addresses a fundamental source of inefficiency in
socialist economies: the state’s inability to institute the proper incentives for the economy’s
managers and workers. By assigning ownership rights to specific groups of people,
privatization is seen as a way of addressing the dysfunctional incentive regimes that lead to
the principal-agent problem, as the new owners are in a superior position to carry out the
planning, monitoring, and disciplinary functions the principal ought to perform. Because the
new owners/shareholders have a profit-maximizing motive, the firm’s decisions will
presumably be guided by efficiency considerations, and not political ones. The productivity
gains arising from improved governance can be categorized along three lines (Filer et al,
2001): 1.) reductions in slack (moving closer to the production possibilities frontier), 2.)
improved allocative efficiency (reallocating productive resources along the production
possibility frontier to more efficient uses), or 3.) greater organizational efficiency (inducing
outward shifts of the production function through better management or the adoption of
new production methods).
Privatization can only be successful, however, when accompanied by institutional
reforms which promote efficient, competitive markets. One crucial goal in the reform
process must be to eliminate the soft-budget constraint that had allowed unprofitable firms
to survive under socialism through mechanisms such as distorted factor and product prices
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or transfer payments from the government.1 Since the soft-budget constraint allowed
unprofitable and unviable firms to remain solvent indefinitely, bankruptcies were virtually
nonexistent under socialism, and bankruptcy laws were commensurately ill-defined (World
Bank, 2004). Thus, transition reforms must also introduce laws which enable bankruptcy to
occur and, conversely, lower barriers to entry to facilitate the creation of new firms.
Facilitating firm exit is important because it enables unviable firms to exit and free up scarce
resources – land, labor, capital – for other firms. Stimulating firm entry is important because
newly created (de novo) firms presumably enter the market with a more efficient mix of capital
and labor, newer production technologies, and a more resourceful management.2 Functional
factor markets are a crucial link in this process, as they provide nascent firms with the
necessary resources to facilitate their growth. This study can be viewed as an empirical test
of the overall efficiency of these factor markets, as the relationship between wages and
productivity provide a unique metric for gauging the degree to which these markets are
reallocating resources in an efficient manner.
We should note that entry and exit plays an important role even in developed market
economies – according to a 2002 OECD study, the net contribution to aggregate
productivity growth from the entry and exit of firms typically accounts for between 20 and
40 percent of total productivity growth in these economies (Scarpetta et al, 2002). We may
expect these effects to be especially important in transition economies: since entering firms
are typically smaller in size than incumbents (Richter and Schaffer, 1996), they can correct
the size imbalance of existing firms and shift economic activity from sectors which had been

1

For example, during the 1980’s, the Yugoslav government granted massive soft-budget subsidies in the
form of negative real interest rate loans (Kraft and Vodopivec, 1992).
2
De novo firms are also presumably less likely to engage in dysfunctional behavior such as asset stripping
or tunneling resources for personal gain (World Bank, 2002, p. 27).
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favored by central planners, such as heavy industry, to more viable and previously neglected
ones, such as the service industry.3

3.) Evidence on the effects of privatization
Research on transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has
generally confirmed the expected productivity effects associated with privatization (Djankov
and Murrell, 2002).4 Studies have found the positive effects of privatization across a wide
range of countries, including the Czech Republic (Zemplinerova et al, 1995; Claessens and
Djankov, 1998), Hungary (Campbell, 2002), Estonia (Jones and Mygind, 2001), Romania
(Earle and Telgedy, 2001), Slovenia (Smith et al, 1997; Konings and Xavier, 2003, Orazem
and Vodopivec, 2003), and various cross country comparisons (Claessens et al., 1997;
Frydman et al, 1998; Carlin et al, 2001). For example, in their survey of seven CEE countries,
Claessens et al (1997) find that total factor productivity growth following privatization
increases by about 5 percent per year. Earle and Telgedy (2001) find that privatized firms in
Romania had an average growth rate that was 16% higher than state-owned ones, and Jones
and Mygind (2001) find this figure to be on the order of 18% in their study of Estonian
firms.
Empirical results from studies of de novo firms offer inconclusive results on the
productivity effects of these firms. In their survey of firms in 25 transition countries, Carlin
et al (2001) find that average firm productivity growth was negative in de novo firms while it
3

For example, comparing the sectoral distribution of employment across countries shows that Slovenia,
like other Eastern European countries, placed excessive emphasis on industry: the fraction of the labor
force employed in manufacturing and mining in 1981 was 42.6 percent in Slovenia, compared to 43.5
percent in Hungary, 43.2 percent in Poland, and 30.7 percent in Western Europe ("Yearbook of Labor
Statistics,” ILO Geneva 1981, in Mencinger, 1989).
4
Djankov and Murrell (2002), in their extensive survey of the literature on the topic, also find that the
“privatization effect is statistically insignificant in the Commonwealth of Independent States… these
results are robust” (p. 4).
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was positive in SOE’s and privatized firms. However, they find clear size effects, with
positive productivity growth recorded for de novo firms in the largest size class.5 In their
study of Russian manufacturing firms, Richter and Schaffer (1996) find stronger evidence of
positive performance among de novo firms. They find that while real output declined by 19
percent among privatized firms in the 1993/94 period, it grew by 4 percent de novo firms, a
result that was robust regardless of size. This result is confirmed by Berkowitz and DeJong
(2001), who find a strong positive relationship between regional entrepreneurial activity and
regional economic growth in Russia.6
One significant bias inherent in the many of the above studies stems from the
endogeneity of the decision to privatize a firm. Particularly in countries which adopted a
gradualist privatization strategy, the likelihood that a firm would be privatized was not
independent of its general viability: viable firms were more likely to be privatized, which
means that studies which do not account for this endogeneity will tend to overestimate the
effects of privatization. This is certainly a concern for Slovenia, where the decision to
privatize a firm was strongly influenced by its employees and management (who could
purchase its shares at a 50% discount); employees in firms with poor prospects would be
unlikely to support privatization in an attempt to preserve the firm’s soft budget constraint
(World Bank, 1999).
Another significant problem with studies on the productivity of firms in transition
economies is that none have, to the author’s knowledge, included detailed measures of labor
quality in their production function. That is, in estimating firm level production functions
and examining how efficiently firms produce output given their labor and capital inputs, they
5

They mention that this may be the result of endogeneity: “Larger firms may be larger at the time of
survey because they grew faster” (p. 11).
6
They use the regional registry of small private enterprises per thousand inhabitants as a proxy for the
presence of de novo firms, a rather imperfect measure.
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have failed to account for the multiple qualitative dimensions along which workers may
differ – for example, by education, experience, and seniority.7 As Griliches (1970) contends,
this may introduce potentially serious bias in the estimated coefficients. It is particularly
problematic in the context of transition economies, where firms of different ownership types
(privatized, state-owned) and vintage (newly created vs. state-owned or formerly stateowned) are likely to employ workers with differing demographic characteristics. Studies
which fail to account for worker quality are likely to overstate the productivity of privately
owned firms relative to state-owned ones, since the higher prevailing wages in the private
sector are likely to induce more qualified workers to exit the public sector.

4.) Workers’ self-management
In this section, I discuss the ways in which the Slovenian transition experience may
be influenced by factors specific to its institutional environment under the socialist regime
and the particular decentralized style of socialist planning that the government adopted after
abolishing central planning in 1965. The legacy of workers’ self-management may imply
specific labor market outcomes in which workers’ wages are inflated relative to their
productivity. This section first examines the theoretical considerations, and then turns to the
previous empirical research. Finally, I also briefly discuss the Slovenian transition experience
to date, focusing especially on how we might expect it to impact the wage determination
process.

7

Alternatively, one could argue that such studies do allow for worker heterogeneity within individual
firms, but assume that the proportions of these workers along various qualitative dimensions – for example,
gender, education and seniority -- are equal across all firms, thus effectively rendering the labor quality
terms irrelevant. Such an assumption is arguably similarly unrealistic.
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4.1) Theory of workers’ self-management
Workers’ self-management, the particular form of socialism Slovenia adopted as a
constituent republic of Yugoslavia, deserves particular attention in the context of a
discussion on firm productivity in Slovenia. Given the nature of the wage determination
process in Slovenia, with the strong role of unions and long-term bargaining agreements, we
might expect the salient features of self-managed firms to persist into early transition, thus
contributing to their inefficiency and posing a barrier to restructuring. And, as I outline
below, we might expect that a self-managed firm would tend to operate at a lower level of
employment, output and investment than the profit-maximizing capitalist firm.
In the purest form of workers’ self-management, initially adopted in Yugoslavia in
the 1950’s and 1960’s, the self-managed firm vested virtually complete control in its
workers.8 Thus these workers, “in a one-man-one-vote basis, were the ultimate repository of
economic decision making” (Granick, 1975, p. 336). Workers elected the members of the
workers’ council, which played the role of a capitalist firm’s board of directors – they
designated the general director and the management board (which was charged with
managing the firm’s daily operations). The firm operated as an individual cooperative – net
receipts, after deducting expenses other than wages, were divided between net investments
and a wage fund distributed to the membership. Thus, firms could choose to invest heavily
at the expense of the current wage fund, hoping that they would increase future productivity
– and thus the workers’ wages – through current sacrifices, or they could decide to disburse

8

After 1972, state intervention in the firms’ operations increased, and restrictions were imposed upon
firms’ ability to disburse profits through workers’ wages (Granick, 1975, and World Bank, 2004).
Moreover, because bankruptcy was socially-undesirable and essentially non-existent (World Bank, 2004),
firms operated under a soft-budget constraint (Kornai, 1980). In-effect, the profits of efficient firms were
thus used to subsidize the losses of inefficient ones (Kraft and Vodopivec, 1992).
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their entire profits to workers in the form of higher wages, allocating nothing to investment
(Granick, 1975).
Despite their great social appeal and democratic, egalitarian nature, worker managed
firms may tend to have a propensity for allocative inefficiency and perverse economic
behavior. As first outlined by Ward (1958), we may expect the self-managed firm to pursue
a set of incentives particular to its specific situation – instead of maximizing total profit, as a
capitalist firm will in the long-run, a self-managed firm may attempt to maximize its profit
per worker. Assuming the self-managed firm has N types of labor which are perfectly
substitutable inputs with potentially differing marginal products, we can formally express the
objective function workers will attempt to maximize as

Taking the derivative with respect to Li yields

First order conditions require that

or equivalently, that

This outcome differs markedly from the outcome one expects from the capitalist firm.
Consider again the standard profit function with N labor types

Denoting the total wage bill as WB, we have
Profit maximization requires that
13
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Rearranging yields

or equivalently, that

and thus economic efficiency requires that the marginal revenue product equals the marginal
cost of hiring each type of labor, given by the derivative of the wage bill with respect to Li.
These outcomes are clearly illustrated in Figure 1 below. We see that whenever the
Value Marginal Product of Labor (VMPL) is less than the Value Average Product of Labor
(VAPL), the self-managed firm can increase VAPL by decreasing the number of workers
employed. Conversely, whenever VMPL > VAPL, VAPL can be increased by increasing
employment. Thus, the self-managed firm will tend to operate at w= wself-managed and l= lself. A profit-maximizing firm, by contrast, will continue to hire labor as long as VMPL is

managed

greater than the equilibrium wage rate, weq, but not past leq since this would decrease total
profits. Thus, as is evident from Figure 1, wself-managed > weq and lself-managed < leq.
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Figure 1: Wage-employment outcomes under workers’ self-management

Wage

Labor demand curve for
profit-maximizing firm

VMPL

wself-managed
VAPL

weq

Level of
Employment
Moreover, a firm’s incentive to distribute its surplus in the form of wages is even
lself--managed

leq

stronger given that part of the firm’s surplus is retained by the government. Many
economists have argued that this led to the so-called “underinvestment problem” in
Yugoslavia, whereby firms did not reinvest profits they otherwise may have due to short
time-horizons and the exacerbating effects of government intervention (Bonin and
Putterman, 1987). Thus, we would expect that self-managed firms will be inefficient both in
the short- and the long-run: in the short-run, because they do not operate at the efficient
frontier, and efficiency gains could be reaped through reductions in slack and increasing
employment; and in the long-run, because sub-optimal levels of investment lead to
antiquated technology and equipment and insufficient capital.9 Also, we would expect that
VMPL would tend to be higher in the self-managed firm than in its capitalist counterpart.

9

In addition, there are many other theoretical predictions on the perverse behavior of self-managed firms–
for example, “increases in the relative scarcity of a commodity actually signal suppliers to reduce their
production of it, generating allocative inefficiency” (Estrin, 1983, p. 21).
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4.2) Research on self-managed firms and formerly self-managed firms in transition
Competing views on of workers’ self-management have spawned an abundance of
empirical research on the subject, with authors attempting to attribute firm inefficiencies and
the large wage dispersion found in workers’ self-managed economies to various factors
(Bonin and Putterman, 1987; Prašnikar and Svejnar, 1991). While the majority of this
research focuses on the pre-1991 period when Slovenia was still a part of Yugoslavia, the
extremely slow pace of reform in Slovenia suggests that many of its characteristics are likely
to persist in the early transition period.
A large number of studies on productivity under workers’ self-management focus on
the under-investment problem, attributing variations in earnings and efficiency to the capital
allocation process and the fact that firms were not required to pay the full opportunity cost
for capital previously allocated to them by planners. Thus, for example, Vanek and Jovcic
(1975) contend that differing levels of investment between firms, evidenced by significant
variation in capital to labor ratio across otherwise similar firms, are the most important
factor in explaining wage dispersions, while factors such as concentration ratios have little
impact on them. Other researchers focus more on the endogeneity of worker earnings and
use differences in labor productivity to explain wage dispersion. Wachtel (1973), for
example, using industry level productivity data from 1956 to 1968, finds that average
earnings are closely related to labor productivity at the industry level.10 In fact, he finds that
two variables – labor productivity and industry concentration – explain as much as 81
percent of the variation in mean earnings in certain years. Still other authors offering
competing views, contending that theoretical models of workers’ self-management have
10

Estrin (1983) finds similar results.
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been rendered useless since the 1970’s because of increased government intervention in firm
behavior – Prašnikar and Svejnar (1991), for example, find that “there is evidence that, in the
past two decades, income determination in Yugoslav firms has reflected political rather than
self-management forces” (p. 35).11
The empirical literature on the behavior of formerly self-managed firms during the
transition period is comparatively sparse. Prašnikar and Svejnar (2003), analyzing a panel of
Slovenian firms over the 1991-1995 period, find that many firms – particularly those
eventually privatized to insiders – tended to exhibit a tradeoff between investment and wages
(as the Ward model would predict). Moreover, workers in (frequently loss-making) firms
which were not headed by elite, powerful managers and which were privatized to outsiders
also appeared to engage in some surplus sharing (which they infer from the higher wages of
workers in these firms). Overall, Prašnikar and Svejnar (2003) thus find that many of the
salient features of workers’ self-management were still observable in certain groups of firms
in early transition.
It is important to note that, due mainly to a lack of suitable data, the above studies
tend to focus on corollaries that do not directly address the central propositions outlined by
Ward (1958) – that the wages of workers in self-managed firms will tend to be inflated
relative to what their marginal revenue product would warrant. That is, while questions such
as sub-optimal levels of investment are, to a certain degree, important in their own right,
they are ultimately relevant insomuch as they affect total factor productivity (and wages) in
the long run. For example, the so-called “underinvestment problem” is deemed problematic
because, in the long-run, sub-optimal levels of investment lead to an antiquated capital stock

11

Estrin and Svejnar (1993) as well as Prašnikar, Svejnar et al (1994) corroborate this view, finding that the
appropriation of capital rents by workers does not account for high interindustry earnings differentials
during the same period.
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that translates into lower total factor productivity.12 Studies that analyze the underinvestment
productivity, in effect, use current investment as a proxy for future productivity, but do not
yield conclusions that are directly translatable into tangible economic effects. By contrast, the
approach used in this study, which directly compares wage and productivity differentials
across different types of firms, overcomes these shortcomings.

5.) Institutional considerations
As discussed above, the Slovenian economy operated under a particular style of
socialism that differed from the Soviet-type command economy in that it maintained a quasimarket economy with flexible prices and open unemployment (World Bank, 2004).
Although the theory section described above assumed a relatively pure system of workers
self-management, the reality is that by the late 1980’s, there was extensive political
interference in firm decisions regarding investment, employment and wages. Firms operated
with soft-budget constraints in which a massive system of discretionary taxes and transfers
taxed away net revenue from profitable enterprises in order to subsidize failing firms. As
such, inefficient firms could lose money indefinitely, while efficient firms could not build up
reserves that could allow expansion (Orazem and Vodopivec, 2003).
Since seceding from Yugoslavia and beginning the transition to a market economy in
1991, the Slovenian government adopted a gradualist approach to reform relative to other
transition economies (World Bank, 2002). The legal process for privatizing large state
enterprises began in 1993; privatization itself was initiated in 1994 and continues today
despite several waves of privatization, with almost 50 percent of output still controlled by
12

Similarly, the sub-optimal levels of employment predicted by the Ward hypothesis would also translate
into lower levels of total factor productivity.
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the state (World Bank, 2004). Although the reform process was expedited by Slovenia’s
accession to the European Union in May 2004, many pressing reforms still need to be
carried out, particularly in the banking and financial services sectors (IMAD, 2005).

19

Matija Vodopivec

Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia

Chapter II: Effects of Transition on Productivity and Wage Differentials
across Different Types of Workers
1.) Introduction
For workers in economies undergoing the transition from a plan to market, the past
decade and a half has been a turbulent period. Under the previous regimes, they had
enjoyed generous benefits such as guaranteed employment and job security, sociallymandated minimum wages, and numerous fringe benefits, such as extended vacations in
company-owned vacation houses. Moreover, their governments had been – at least
nominally – committed to wage equality for all workers. Since the onset of transition,
however, governments have been progressively abandoning their previously paternalistic
roles and granting firms greater freedom with their employment policies, allowing them
discretion in the process of hiring and laying off workers, creating and destroying jobs, and
deciding on their wage regimes. In the process, some workers have suffered long
unemployment spells or sharp earnings declines; some have retired early or temporarily left
the labor force to work at home or upgrade skills; and some have switched occupation,
industry, or residency; all with considerable disruption to the lives and jobs of family
members.
Of course, these changes have come as part of a larger set of liberalization and
marketization reforms aimed at improving the competitiveness of the economy. One
underlying premise has been that such reforms will lead to outcomes consistent with what
we would expect to see in a developed market economy – with higher levels of labor
productivity and wages which roughly correspond to the marginal revenue product posited
by economic theory. Despite a voluminous body of literature examining a variety of labor
market issues – ranging from analyses of wage differentials to studies on worker and job
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flows – this fundamental relationship between wages and productivity remains untested
empirically.
In this paper, I use a novel approach proposed by Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske
(1999) to conduct a direct empirical test of the relationship between relative wages and the
marginal productivity of workers. This allows us to examine several pressing questions
regarding the impact of transition on the labor market. For example, to what extent have
the increased returns to education during transition reflected growth in labor productivity,
and to what extent do they reflect a liberalization of the forced wage compression under the
previous regime?13 How can we explain the narrowing wage gap in transition economies –
has the marginal productivity of women increased relative to men?14 Finally, how have older
workers coped with the changing skills and knowledge required in a modern market
economy – have they been able to adjust their skills, judging by the productivity differentials
of older workers relative to younger ones?
Using an unusually rich administrative database containing employer-employee
matched data spanning a ten-year period, this study examines the wage and productivity
differentials among different types of workers in Slovenia.15 The results offer unprecedented
empirical insight into the dynamic relationship between relative wages and marginal
productivity throughout the transition process. The results indicate that wage and
productivity differentials have been progressively converging over the transition period,

13

For example, Vodopivec (1993) finds that in a Yugoslav firm with several thousand workers, the pay of
the highest manager was only 4.54 times that of the lowest paid worker.
14
In a survey on the topic, Brainerd (2000) finds that, with the exception of Russia and the Ukraine,
women’s relative wages have consistently increased across Eastern Europe during the transition process.
15
Having abolished central planning in 1965 in favor of workers’ self-management, a quasi-market type
economy with flexible prices, the problems that the former Yugoslav republics faced at the onset of
transition were arguably less severe than in other transition economies (where central planning was not
abolished until the collapse of socialism). However, most of the salient features of socialist economies –
for example, guaranteed job security, state ownership of the means of production, soft-budget constraints –
were also present in Slovenia.
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indicating that market liberalization is in fact becoming a reality. They also show that older
workers have lagged considerably behind younger workers in acquiring the skills that the
new economic conditions demand of them, as witnessed by the precipitous fall in their
marginal productivities over the past decade. Moreover, the increased returns to education
over the transition period reflect genuine productivity growth and not simply a liberalization
of the previously forced wage compression, and we can thus be expect that the returns to
education may continue to increase in the future.
In what follows, I first present an overview of several wage determination theories in
Section 2. This provides a theoretical framework for a discussion of the measurement
problems inherent in empirical tests of the relationship between wages and productivity,
which is the subject of Section 3. Section 4 briefly discusses the institutional considerations
specific to the Slovenia. (Methodological issues, a description of the data used in the analysis,
and a presentation of the results are the subject of the concluding chapter, Chapter III.)

2.) Wage Determination Theories
There are many competing theories on how an individual’s characteristics affect their
productivity and determine their wages (see Hutchens, 1989, for a survey). Generally
speaking, the most established theory of wage determination – the human capital theory –
posits that worker productivity closely corresponds to the degree of education, training and
experience that person has accumulated (Becker, 1962). When an individual is acquiring
firm-specific capital, human capital theory predicts a wage which exceeds marginal
productivity because the firm will incur the costs of training the individual firm-specific
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skills.16 In order to recoup these costs, the productivity profile of the individual is steeper
than the wage profile, and thus productivity exceeds wages as seniority increases. If the skills
gained through experience are not firm specific but general, then the wage and productivity
profiles should be more similar. In both cases, human capital theory implies that wages grow
with seniority because productivity grows with seniority.
Alternative theories of job tenure dispute this contention. Implicit contract theory
(Lazear, 1979) maintains that wage determination should also be understood in terms of the
agency problems facing an employer. It argues that employers and employees may enter
implicit contracts whereby at the beginning of employment, workers are paid less than the
value of the marginal of labor, whereas the opposite is true after employees have stayed with
the employer for a long period of time. Such wage policy discourages shirking in situations
where employee effort is difficult to monitor, because honest and hard-working employees –
who are less likely to be fired in the long run – will be rewarded with a wage premium in the
years leading up to their retirement. This theory predicts that wages may grow with job
tenure even when productivity decreases with seniority.
Theories of job matching also offer alternative predictions on wage determination
(Jovanovic, 1979). These theories are based on the idea that imperfect information exists on
both sides of the market about the exact location of one’s optimal job assignment. After an
initial job assignment, new information is available about an individual’s skills and
preferences, and a job separation may be mutually beneficial for the employer and employee.
Thus, matches that turn out ex post to be good survive longer and lead to longer tenure at a
16

Various alternative flavors of this general approach have been proposed. Lazear(2003), for example,
proposes a “skill-weights” human capital theory whereby virtually all skills acquired on the job are general,
but firms vary in their weighting of these skills. Returns to tenure are explained as the result of the value
firms place on the particular set of more specific skills and knowledge individuals develop with longer
tenure, and wage losses upon employment with another firm are explained as a result of an inferior job
match.
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firm. Employers may use steep earnings profiles to sort out workers and accelerate the
process of job matching.
The wage determination process may be viewed in light of market imperfections
which result from either discrimination or imperfect labor market competition (e.g.
collective bargaining agreements). In the case of the first, if employers exhibit a distaste for
employing workers with certain demographic characteristics (for example, women), the
equilibrium outcome will be one in which such workers are paid less than the marginal
revenue product of their labor (Becker, 1971) – that is, a wage differential will arise large
enough to induce employers to hire workers from this demographic group. In the case of
imperfectly competitive labor markets, labor unions may negotiate collective bargaining
agreements which mandate minimum wages based on a worker’s characteristics such as age,
seniority, education, and so forth. In both cases, a workers’ wage may be unrelated to his or
her productivity within the firm.
The impact of an individual’s education on productivity can be explained by two
theories, human capital theory and signaling theory. Human capital theory posits that
additional education increases the productive capacity of the individual through the
acquisition of knowledge and skills required to perform more complex jobs. It thus predicts
a causal relationship between education and productivity which is reflected in higher wages.
In the context of transition, human capital theory predicts that older workers may possess
human capital that is obsolete, and thus that ceteris paribus, older, well-educated workers will
be less productive than their younger counterparts. Signaling theory (Spence, 1973), by
contrast, views education merely as a screening process through which individuals can signal
their skills to potential employers. Employers use education as a proxy for ability with which
they detect the best candidates in a heterogeneous applicant pool and overcome the
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informational asymmetry inherent in the labor market. Hence, signaling theory predicts that
educated individuals will be more productive not because of the skills and knowledge they
have acquired during the course of their education, but because of their superior abilities. In
the context of transition, signaling theory implies that even educated older workers will be
able to adapt to the changing skills and knowledge demanded in a market economy since
their education is a sign of latent abilities or intellectual capacities.
3) Measurement issues and Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence examining the relationship between wages and productivity
has largely yielded inconclusive results (Hutchens, 1989). While a large number of studies
have been conducted on the topic, the validity of many of them has been questioned because
of the measurement issues that most fail to fully address. Ideally, modeling the relationship
between wages and productivity would entail relating an individual workers’ wage with that
worker’s effect, at the margin, on the firm’s total output. The most significant problem
facing studies which attempt to link these two factors is that, while measuring an individual
workers’ wage is relatively straightforward, obtaining a meaningful estimate of his or her
marginal productivity is usually not.
This problem can be most easily overcome by studying situations where the nature
of the production process is such that an individual’s output is easily measured (Lazear,
2003). The results of such studies generally confirm the hypotheses of the human capital
model and theories of job matching. Thus, for example, in his study of glass installers in an
auto glass manufacturing plant, Lazear (2000) finds significant tenure effects, with strong
evidence of both on-the-job learning and sorting, with high separation rates amongst
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unproductive workers.17 Paarsch and Shearer (1997), as well as Fernie and Metcalf (1996),
find similar results. In general, however, researchers have resorted to rather imperfect
proxies for marginal productivity.
However, quantifying the marginal productivity of workers with differing
demographic characteristics is much more difficult for the majority of jobs in an advanced
industrial society, where heterogeneous workers are often complementary inputs in the
production process, and several different approaches have been proposed. One proxy for
productivity is employee performance evaluations. Medoff and Abraham (1980), in their
study of two large U.S. manufacturing corporations, find that increased wages that came
about with longer tenure were not associated with improved performance ratings. They
interpret this as evidence discrediting the human capital model, as the wage and productivity
models appear to differ. However, their results are suspect for two reasons. Firstly,
psychologists have long pointed to the numerous biases of job performance ratings which
arise from factors such as halo error, positive leniency, and random response error
(Viswesveran et al, 2005), making them suspect from a measurement point of view.
Secondly, such studies may yield different, but equally valid, interpretations. For example,
Dohman (2004), who replicates the methodology in Medoff and Abraham (1980), using
personnel data from a Dutch aircraft manufacturer and finds similar results, contends that
such results can arise even when wage and productivity profiles are similar, arguing that as
workers are promoted, their relative performance ratings fall, but increase with tenure in a
given position – a result that finds empirical support in his data. Thus, performance
evaluations appear to be a generally inaccurate proxy for productivity.

17

The estimated effects are on the order of 34% per year, a figure that can be explained by the high worker
turnover rate – the average tenure length is 8 months.
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A relatively new framework for analyzing the relationship between marginal
productivity of workers and their relative wages – and the one used in this study – is the one
proposed by Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999). Using plant-level data which includes
detailed data on the demographic characteristics of the labor force, they jointly estimate an
augmented production function with a quality of labor term and with a plant-level wage bill
equation. (Since their methodology is also used in this paper, the details of their exposition
are relegated to the methodology discussion in Section 3). Their results enable them to
directly compare wage and productivity differentials (although the nature of their data does
not permit them to classify workers into very specific groups). They find that, ceteris
paribus, the marginal productivity of workers aged 35-54 is 15 percent greater than that of
their counterparts who are younger than 35, and that the older workers’ wages are 19 percent
greater (the four percent difference is statistically insignificant). This result is in line with
human capital theory’s predictions. Another of their findings, however, supports the
discrimination hypothesis, as the gender wage gap – whereby, according to their estimates,
women earn 45 percent less than men – is not justified by women’s 16 percent lower
marginal productivity (a statistically significant difference).
Similar studies have been carried out by Hellerstein and Neumark (1999), Haegeland
and Klette (1999), Jones (2001), Crepon, Deniau, and Perez-Duarte (2002), and Illmakunnas
et al (2004). Their results are summarized in Table 1 below for comparison (note that S and
T respectively refer to the productivity and wage differentials of the specified group relative
to the omitted group):
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Table 1: Empirical evidence from joint estimates of productivity (S) and wage (T) differentials
Country
Coefficients on
Coefficients on
Coefficients on other
Female dummies
Education/Skill
dummies
dummies
Hellerstein,
USA
S = 0.84, T = 0.55
…
Aged 35-54:
Neumark and
(difference is
S = 1.15, T = 1.19
Troske (1999)
statistically
Aged 50+:
significant)
S = 1.19, T = 1.18
(Base group: under 35
years of age)
Hellerstein and
Israel
S =0.8, T = 0.75
Technical engineers:
…
Neumark (1999)
(difference between S = 2.0, T = 1.7
T and S not
Engineers:
statistically
S = 4.0, T = 2.25
significant)
(Base group: unskilled
workers)
Haegeland and
Norway
S =0.83, T = 0.82
Low Education:
8-15 years of experience:
Klette (1999)
(difference between S = 1.10, T = 1.20
S = 1.62, T = 1.39
T and S not
Medium Education:
15 + years of experience:
statistically
S = 1.55, T = 1.50
S = 1.33, T = 1.38
significant)
High Education:
(Base group: less than 8
S = 1.80, T = 1.82
years of experience)
(Base group: less than
11 years of education)
…
Jones (2001)
Ghana
S = 0.45, T = 0.86
Primary schooling:
(difference between S = 1.08, T = 1.3
T and S not
Secondary schooling:
statistically
S = 1.54, T = 1.56
significant)
Tertiary schooling:
S = 1.79, T = 1.56
(Base group: no
primary school)
Crepon, Deniau,
France
S = .89, T = 0.86
Skilled:
Aged 25-35:
and Perez(difference between S = 1.20, T = 1.17
S = 1.22, T = 1.23
Duarte (2002)*
T and S not
Highly skilled: S =
Aged 35-50:
statistically
1.88, T = 1.73
S = 1.10, T = 1.27
significant)
(Base group: unskilled Aged 50+:
workers)
S = 1.11, T = 1.41
(Base group: less than 25
years old)
Illmakunnas,
Finland
…
…
2-5 years tenure:
Maliranta and
S = 1.04, T = 1.03
Vainiomaki
5-10 years tenure: S =
(2004)*
1.0, T = 1.05
11-20 years tenure: S =
.95, T = 1.07
(Base group: 1-2 years
tenure)
Notes: (*) indicates statistics which refer to imputed values based on author’s calculations. The coefficients
should be interpreted based on whether they are different from 1. For example, estimates of S = 1.25 and T =
1.35 for women would indicate that the MPL of women is 25 percent greater than that of men, while their
wages are 35 percent greater.

Several stylized facts emerge from these findings. First, the marginal productivity of
women is consistently lower than that of men, as the estimates for S generally range from
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0.75 to 0.9. The estimates for women’s wage differentials appear to be slightly lower than
their productivity differentials, although we cannot conclude this with certainty because the
difference tends to be statistically insignificant (and thus we cannot interpret the disparity as
conclusive evidence of discrimination). Second, better educated workers are more
productive, with the most educated (skilled) workers approximately twice as productive as
the least educated (skilled). Their wage differentials also appear to be slightly lower than
their productivity would warrant, indicating a certain degree of wage compression. Thirdly,
the evidence on the effects of job tenure and age are inconclusive, but we may tentatively say
that the marginal productivity with respect to age or tenure appears to be negative past a
certain point in workers’ careers.
Although much of the empirical evidence discussed above appears to favor the
human capital model, we should recognize that this model is nevertheless quite incomplete
in that it still fails to explain a large portion of the variation in wages. In standard earnings
equations for individuals of the same race and sex in the United States, for example, between
two-thirds and four-fifths of the variance of the natural logarithm of wages is unexplained
after accounting for the factors which are included in these models – factors such as age,
years of schooling, labor market experience, and parental characteristics (Bowles, Gintis, and
Osborne, 2001). Studies have found that many seemingly irrelevant factors – including
personal characteristics such as beauty, height, obesity and even whether one keeps a clean
house – can often be robust predictors of wages (Bowles et al, 2001). We should thus bear in
mind that although the methodology used in joint estimations of productivity and wage
differentials may offer the best estimates on the relationship between wages and productivity
to date, the data used in these studies appear to exclude some intangible, unobservable
factors we have yet to fully understand.
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4.) Institutional Considerations
Under socialism, the wage determination process in Yugoslavia was highly regulated
by the government, which set each firms’ total wage bill. A firm’s wage scale was
determined by a referendum of its employees, and the resulting distribution of wages was
highly compressed in comparison to capitalist firms (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003). In
1991, the government passed legislation formally removing these governmental
administrative constraints, and since then collective bargaining agreements – which are
legally binding for all firms – have played a major role in the wage determination process.
These collective bargaining agreements mandate minimum pay scales based on an
individual’s education (for example, those with a Ph.D must be paid at least 3 times the
minimum wage), seniority (they specify that an individual must receive at least a 0.5 percent
wage increase for each additional year of tenure), and hours which must count as overtime.
Despite the high level of disaggregation in the collective bargaining agreements, the system
allows for idiosyncratic deviations in wages, which may arise on a firm-specific or even a
worker-specific basis, since the collective bargaining agreement generally only sets a wage
floor. Empirical results indicate that the system still allows for considerable flexibility in the
wage determination process in practice (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003), and thus we
may expect to find evidence of sizable competitive forces acting in the labor market.
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Chapter III – Methodology, Actual Data, and Results
1) General methodological approach
In this section, I outline the methodology used in this study and contrast it with
conventional approaches used in studies on wage determination and firm productivity. Note
that, generally speaking, the literature on these two topics has previously been confined to
separate studies in the spheres of labor and industrial economics, respectively, due mainly to
a limited availability of data which would link them together. I also discuss the limitations of
these studies in obtaining accurate estimates of productivity.
Typical studies on wage determination focus on wage regressions of individual level
data. Using the log-linear model with wages as the dependent variable, these models examine
the wage differentials attributed to various worker characteristics such as gender, age,
seniority, and so forth. Thus, such models follow the functional form introduced by Mincer
(1974), which can be written as
ln w = W0 + SUM(i=0, n) WiDi + X
where ln w is the logarithm of wages, W0 is the constant term and D is a vector of individual
characteristics such as gender, education, work experience, seniority, and so forth.
The problem with using this approach to test theories on wage determination is that,
without independent measures of productivity differentials, it is difficult to determine
whether wage differentials associated with worker characteristics actually reflect differences
in productivity or whether they arise from other factors, such as market imperfections in the
form of sticky wages or discrimination. Also, in the absence of corresponding information
of productivity, it is difficult to verify which theory of wage determination (e.g. human
capital theory, implicit contract theory) has the most empirical support in the data.
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The approach used in this study draws heavily on the model pioneered by
Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), in which production functions and wage equations
are estimated jointly, allowing for direct comparisons of the wage and productivity
differentials. I briefly review their methodology, and examine how the availability of
additional control variables for ownership type can add to this framework.

1.1) Actual model for estimating productivity differentials
Consider a simple production function in which value-added output Y is a function
of capital inputs K and a quality of labor aggregate QL. Using a translog production
function, the model can be described as
lnY=ln(A) + Z ln(K) + W ln(QL) + g(K,QL) + [iXi + µ

(1)

where g(K,QL) represent the second order terms of the translog production function
(Jorgensen et al, 1973), [iXi is a vector of dummy variables capturing firm characteristics
such as ownership type and industry, and µ is the stochastic error term.
For each plant, assume for simplicity that we can differentiate workers based on a
single characteristic, their gender. Assuming the workers are perfectly substitutable inputs
with potentially different marginal products, we can define QL as
QL=L(1+ (SF-1) F/L)

(2)

were L is the total number of workers in the plant, F is the number of women in the plant,
and SF is the marginal productivity of women relative to men. Substituting equation (2) into
equation (1) yields a plant level production from which SF can be estimated.
The actual data permit us to distinguish the each plants workforce not only based on
gender, but also by education, job tenure, and age. Workers are classified into six education
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groups (completed elementary school, vocational school, high school, 2-year college, and at
least 4-year college), three categories of tenure length (less than 2 years, 2-5 years, more than
5 years), and four age categories (less than 30 years old, 30-39, 40-49, more than 50 years
old). A firm’s workforce can thus be fully described by each of the 144 possible
combinations that these multiple dimensions can capture, and obtaining exact estimates for
each of these groups would require including 144 terms for the productivity differentials
(S‘s) in the production function.
In order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem, a simplifying restriction on the
model is imposed. I restrict the productivity differentials of workers in one demographic
category to be equal for those same types of workers in another demographic category.
Thus, for example, I assume that the productivity differentials of young women (those in the
first age category, less than 30 years old) relative to young men is equal to the productivity
differentials of the oldest women (those more than 50 years old) relative to the oldest men.
Similarly, the productivity differentials of the youngest women relative to the oldest women
are constrained to be equal to the productivity differentials of the youngest men relative to
the oldest men. With these simplifying restrictions, the quality of labor term becomes
QL = [L + (1+( SF -1) F] · [1 + (SEDU2-1) EDU2 + (SEDU3-1) EDU3 + (SEDU4-1) EDU4
+ (SEDU5-1) EDU5 + (SEDU6-1) EDU6] · [1 + (SAGE2-1) AGE2 + (SAGE3-1) AGE3 +
(SAGE4-1) AGE4] · [1 + (STENURE2-1) TENURE2 + (STENURE3-1) TENURE3]
where EDU2-EDU6 reflect the number of workers with completed elementary school,
vocational school, high school, 2-year college, and at least 4-year college, respectively;
AGE2, AGE3 and AGE4 reflect the number of workers aged 30-39, 40-49, and over 50
years, respectively; and TENURE2 and TENURE3 reflect the number of workers with 2-5
and more than 5 years of tenure at the present firm, respectively. Note that because of the
way the coefficients are defined, productivity differentials between different groups should
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be interpreted based on whether the coefficients are different from one, and not zero. Thus,
a finding that SF = 1.25 would imply that women are 25% more productive than men.
1.2) Actual model for estimating wage differentials
In order for the wage differentials to be directly comparable to the productivity
differentials in the model described above, the model used in this study deviates from those
typically used in studies analyzing the determinants of wages. Again, this study emulates the
model used by Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), and is briefly outlined below.
For the purposes of explaining the model, assume again that workers can be
differentiated based on only one demographic characteristic, their gender. Since we have
matched employer-employee data containing information on each person’s earnings in a
given year, we can come up with a total wage bill for employers if we sum up the individual
level earnings. That is, we begin by considering the individual level-wage equations in levels
wi,j =wM Mi,j + wF Fi,j

(3)

where Mi and Fi are dummy variables for men and women, respectively, for the i-th worker
in plant j, and wM and wF are the individual wages of men and women. Summing this
equation over all workers yields plant level wage bills, which can be expressed as
w =wM (L - F) + wF F

(4)

Defining TF as the relative wage of women to men (TF = wM/wF), we have
w = wM (L - F) + TF wM F = wM (L + (TF – 1) F)

(4)

ln(w) = ln(wM (L + (TF – 1) F))

(5)

or, equivalently,

Equation (5) thus yields estimates of wage differentials that are directly comparable to the
marginal productivity differentials obtained from (1).
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Since I have data on workers’ wages based not only on their gender but also based on the
other characteristics described above, the actual equation that I estimate is
ln(w) = ln (wbase)+ ln [(1+( TF -1) F] · [1 + (TEDU2-1) EDU2 + (TEDU3-1) EDU3 + (TEDU41) EDU4 + (TEDU5-1) EDU5 + (TEDU6-1) EDU6] · [1 + (TAGE2-1) AGE2 + (TAGE3-1)
AGE3 + (TAGE4-1) AGE4] · [1 + (TTENURE2-1) TENURE2 + (TTENURE3-1) TENURE3] +
[iXi + µ

(6)

where wbase is the wage of individuals in the omitted group, the wage differential coefficients
T correspond to their respective definitions for equation (3), [iXi is a vector of dummy
variables capturing firm characteristics such as ownership type and industry, and µ is the
stochastic error term.
Estimating the equation in (5) along with the augmented production function in (1)
then yields directly comparable measures of marginal productivity (S) and wage differentials
(T). Note that the restrictions of equiproportionate distributions of wage differentials across
varying demographic characteristics are retained as in (3), and that the coefficients again
need to be interpreted based on whether they differ from 1, and not 0.

2.) The Data
The actual data used in this study are from a comprehensive panel of Slovenian
firms from 1992 until 2001 and comprehensive matching individual level data for these firms
(see Table 2 below for data sources). The data include all registered legal businesses in the
business sector from 1992 until 2001; thus, for each year, the firm level data contains
between 21,046 and 38,454 observations (see Appendix 1 for details). In order to construct
a matched employer-employee database, the worker- and firm-level databases were merged
according to the universal firm identifier codes used for tax purposes. Because the firm-level
data contained information on the number of workers employed in the firm, it was possible
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to ensure that a sufficient number of workers were matched to a firm so that the sample
could be used to make reliable inferences about the demographic characteristics of the firm’s
workforce. Due to errors in the identifiers and lapses in the data, a considerable number of
observations were lost in the process; after merging the worker and firm level data, the
resulting matched employer-employee database contained information on the firms which
employed between 73.8 and 53.4 percent of the workforce.
For each firm and year it was in operation, the resulting data include the following
variables:
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Table 2: Data Sources and Variables Used in the Empirical Model
Variable
Output
number of
workers
employeda
Capitala
Materials
Location
Ownership type
Foreign
ownership
Firm wage bill
Share of women
Employment
shares by
education
Employment
shares by age
Employment
shares by job
tenure
Entry

Basis for calculation
revenues plus net change in inventories,
where applicable
Number of hours worked based on yearly
number

Values taken by variable
Positive integers

value of tangible fixed assets based on
historical cost accounting
cost of goods sold, where applicable
Urban or Rural location
State or Private (includes foreign and
domestic ownership)
Capital origin

Positive values
Positive integers
Dummy if rural
Dummy if majority private-owned

Worker-level data
Worker-level data
Worker-level data

Positive values
Ratio between 0 and 1
Ratio between 0 and 1

Worker-level data

Ratio between 0 and 1

Worker-level data

Ratio between 0 and 1

Positive integers

Dummy if majority foreign- owned

Data source
Agency of the
Republic of
Slovenia for
Public Statistics
and Services
Accounting
Register
Statistical Office
of Slovenia
Business Register

Statistical Office
of Slovenia
Working
Population
Register

Firm data (7-digit firm identifiers)

Dummy if firm exits between 1992
and 2001
Exit
Firm data (7-digit firm identifiers)
Dummy if firm enters between
Own calculations
1992 and 2001
Herfindahl indexb Slovenian activity codes and data on output
0 (perfect competition) to
1(monopoly)
Overall firm
Slovenian activity codes and data on entry,
0 (no entry or exit) to 2 (all firms
turnover ratec
exit
enter and exit)
Note: Because not all firms were in operation for entire year, output and materials were adjusted for the
number of months firm was in operation (data thus represent simulated yearly data). Data on output, materials
and capital were deflated based on the respective deflators from the Statistical Office of Slovenia price index
reports (1991-2001). The identifying variables used to merge data from different sources were a universal 7digit firm identifier and the relevant year.
a A large number of companies with no employees or capital existed in the early 1990’s as more liberal
legislation made it easy to establish a new company (Hrovatin and Uršia,, 2002). These companies were
fictitious; they never de facto performed business operations, but rather were established for tax-avoidance
purposes. As such, they were excluded from the data.
b The Herfindahl index measures the degree of competition based on the output shares of firms. It is defined as

where Sj is the share of firm j in sectoral output in the sample of n firms in the sector. Two-digit sectors are
used to define the respective market (they are based on the Slovenian classification, but are roughly analogous
to the SIC classifications).
c Following Scarpetta et al (2002), the overall firm turnover rate is defined as the sum of the entry and exit rate,
where the entry rate is the number of new firms divided by the total number of incumbent and entrant firms in
a given year, and the exit rate is the number of firms exiting the market in a given year divided by the
incumbents in the previous year.
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The data suffer from several shortcomings. The capital stock is measured by
historical cost instead of its market value, which is problematic given Slovenia’s socialist
legacy. Like many studies using statistical records, no distinction can be made “between
new-startups and small firms that emerge from restitution, spinoffs from state-owned
enterprises, or other forms of privatization” (Brada, 1996, p. 75). Finally, the valuations of
output and material inputs originate from markets where monopoly power is likely to exist –
as a transition market economy that still needs to further liberalize its markets, significant
(although decreasing) monopolistic markups are likely to exist throughout the Slovenian
economy. As a result, interpreting estimates of productivity differentials can be problematic
because they may reflect markups due to imperfect competition instead of actual
productivity levels (Basu and Fernald, 1995). We may thus mistakenly attribute to
productivity increases what is in fact caused by increases in market power.
Fortunately, at least the latter problem can be partially corrected. If we include
measures of sector-level competition in the model, we can control for increases in revenues
that result from imperfect competition and thus attempt to capture the real resource costs of
production. Two indices are used for this purpose. The first – the Herfindahl index – is
widely used (see Earle and Estrin, 1996, for example) and captures the degree of firm market
power by measuring output shares in respective 2-digit industries. However, this measure
does not address an important problem – that is, that similar levels of sectoral concentration
may be associated with differing levels of competition because defining the relevant
geographic market can be problematic (for example, a grocery store’s market is much more
restricted than that of a manufacturing plant). For this reason, a second measure of
competition – the overall firm turnover rate – is used. This measures the fraction of firms
which exit and enter a certain sector in a given year, and as such proxies the degree to which

38

Matija Vodopivec

Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia

markups from imperfect competition induce market entry. Since the Yugoslav economy
was, by Western standards, characterized by low levels of competition,18 a lack of entry
indicates high barriers to entry (e.g. high sunk costs or continued government subsidies to
incumbents). In the absence of entry, firms can thus be posited to possess market power.
Moreover, firm exit can also be seen to be strongly tied to competition because a
competitive environment is more hostile and likely to produce bankrupt firms. However,
even with these modifications, the data do not allow us to consider competition from
imports, which may be an important factor in determining competition given the openness
of Slovenia’s economy.

3.) Results
Tables 3a and 3b presents the results of joint estimations of equations (1) and (6) on
the entire panel of plant-level data spanning the 1992-2001 period. Due to the way the
parameters enter the model, the regressions are estimated using nonlinear least squares.
When examining these results, we should bear in mind that these results describe the average
wage-productivity profiles over the first 10 years of Slovenia’s transition, a turbulent period
during which we would expect significant changes in the wage and productivity profiles of
various demographic groups. (For this reason, I present estimates of these regressions on
the annual, cross-sectional data in the next section.)

18

A 1990 OECD economic report on Yugoslavia notes that "the institutional set-up has encouraged vertical
integration and oligopolistic behaviour in the context of regional autarky" (p. 41). "Barriers to entry applied
not only to private business but also to socialized companies if this threatened the regional or local
monopoly of large conglomerates" (p. 42).
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Table 3a: Joint Estimates of Nonlinear Least Squares Production Function and Wage Equations,
using complete data from 1992-2001 (table is continued on next page)
Log(Value Added)
Log(Wages)
p-value, (1) = (2)
(1)
(2)
Productive inputs
log(Labor)
...
1.21
1.10
and competition
(0.010)
(0.002)
control variables
log(Capital)
...
0.04
…
(0.007)
(log(Labor))2
...
0.01
…
(0.002)
(log(Capital))2
...
0.02
…
(0.001)
log(Labor b Capital)
...
-0.05
…
Overall firm
turnover rate
Herfindahl Index
Firm
Characteristics

De novo (private)
Formerly state
owned (private)
Foreign-owned
Dummy for entry
within current year
Dummy for exit
after current year

(0.002)
0.27
(0.059)
-0.11
(0.042)
1.07
(0.009)
1.14
(0.009)
1.24
(0.009)
1.04
(0.029)

-0.08
(0.055)
0.00
(0.039)
0.75
(0.008)
0.82
(0.008)
1.24
(0.009)
1.04
(0.027)

...
...
0.00
0.00
0.99
0.91

0.00
0.52
0.71
(0.019)
(0.017)
0.00
Rural firm dummy
0.90
0.96
(0.006)
(0.005)
R2
0.8185
0.8625
2
Adjusted R
0.8184
0.8624
F-statistic
13279.24
20710.42
N
109,023
109,023
Notes: Standard errors of the estimates are reported in parentheses. The third column presents p-values for
the Wald test for the equality of the corresponding coefficients in that row. Estimates of the intercept are not
reported. The excluded age category comprises of workers less than 30 years old, the excluded education
category comprises of workers with unfinished elementary education, and the excluded firm type are
cooperatives and firms with mixed or state ownership. Other control variables included in both equations are
industry and year dummies.
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Table 3b: Joint Estimates of Nonlinear Least Squares Production Function and Wage Equations,
using complete data from 1992-2001 (cont.)
Log(Value Added)
Log(Wages)
p-value, (1) = (2)
(1)
(2)
Demographic
0.00
0.93
1.01
Women
characteristics
(0.007)
(0.005)
0.00
30-39 years old
1.00
1.06
(0.010)
(0.007)
0.00
40-49 years old
0.99
1.14
(0.010)
(0.008)
0.00
50+
1.01
1.29
(0.015)
(0.013)
0.00
2-5 years tenure
0.97
1.04
(0.007)
(0.006)
0.00
5+ years tenure
0.87
1.00
(0.013)
(0.010)
Completed
elementary school
1.14
1.08
0.27
(0.042)
(0.027)
0.49
Vocational school
1.27
1.24
(0.045)
(0.029)
0.00
High school
1.79
1.44
(0.062)
(0.033)
0.00
2-year college
2.11
1.63
(0.075)
(0.039)
0.00
4-year college
2.39
1.79
(0.084)
(0.042)
R2
0.8185
0.8625
Adjusted R2
0.8184
0.8624
F-statistic
13279.24
20710.42
N
109,023
109,023
Notes: See notes on previous page.

The regressions yield several interesting results. Most noticeable is the stark
discrepancy in the wage and productivity differentials in both privatized and newly created
firms. While newly created (private) firms are 7 percent more productive than their stateowned counterparts (with S = 1.07 in the left column), their wages are 25 percent lower
(T=0.75 in the right column); similarly, formerly state-owned firms are 14 percent more
productive yet pay 18 percent lower wages. The results thus appear to be in line with Ward’s
(1958) theoretical model on firm behavior under workers self-management, which predicts
that workers in self-managed firms will appropriate some of the firm’s profits and thus earn
more than their MPL would warrant. However, this finding is complicated by the
41

Matija Vodopivec

Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia

productivity and wage differentials in foreign-owned firms which – assuming foreign owned
firms exhibit behavior consistent with profit-maximization – appear to indicate that the
wage/productivity differentials in state-owned firms are justified: foreign owned firms are 24
percent more productive than state-owned ones, and their productivity differentials are also
not statistically significantly different from this 24 percent.
The coefficients for the demographic characteristics are also interesting. Contrary to
previous empirical findings, neither of the coefficients for women deviate considerably from
1 – although the estimates of SF = 0.93 and TF = 1.01 are both statistically distinguishable
from 1, this difference is not practically meaningful. These plant level results conflict with
individual-level wage regressions (reported in Appendix 2) on the same data, which indicate
a statistically significant wage gap of 13 percent. How can we reconcile these findings? It
appears that while women’s wages do reflect their marginal productivities – and thus, little
evidence of plant-level gender discrimination exists – women tend to be segregated in firms
and industries with lower wages in general. Narrowing the gender wage gap would thus
require women to enter occupations (and firms) that pay higher wages.
I next turn to the estimates of age-productivity and age-wage differentials. The
results indicate that older workers are neither more nor less productive than the base group,
individuals under 30 years of age – the estimates for S are not statistically distinguishable
from 1.19 These age-productivity profiles appear to differ from empirical findings from
other studies, which find evidence of concave profiles in which worker productivity peaks at
around 40 years of age (Ilmakunnas et al, 2002; Hellerstein et al, 1999). Their relative wages,
by contrast, yield a starkly different conclusion – older workers earn a wage premium that

19

These results are particularly striking in light of Slovenia’s early retirement schemes, which we would
expect to have decreased the number of the relatively lower paid – and, presumably, less productive –
older workers in the workforce (see preceding discussion).
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ranges from 6 percent for those between 30 and 39 years old to 29 percent for those older
than 50. The wage determination process appears to be most strongly influenced by the
collective bargaining agreements, which mandate minimum wage levels for older workers.
Examining the wage and productivity differentials regarding job tenure yields
similarly puzzling findings as those regarding age. The estimates imply that productivity
tends to decrease with tenure, averaging 3 percent less after 2-5 years at a firm and 13
percent thereafter. These results are in stark contrast with theoretical predictions, which
predict that productivity should, at the very least, increase with tenure as workers acquire
firm-specific knowledge and skills. The wage profiles indicate a weakly concave profile in
which individuals with 2-5 years of tenure earn a 4 percent wage premium that disappears
for those with longer tenure.
The wage and productivity differentials for various educational groups are largely in
accord with our theoretical predictions and previous empirical evidence. Examining the
productivity profiles shows a steep increase in productivity with increased education,
indicating that those with completed elementary education are 14 percent more productive
than those with uncompleted elementary education, while those with at least four year
college degrees are 139 percent more productive. Comparing these figures with the wage
differentials shows continuing evidence of wage compression, as individuals are consistently
paid about a third less than their MPL would warrant in every educational group with the
exception of those who completed vocational school.
The other coefficients are also of some interest. Most of the second order
coefficients of the translog production function are significant, providing evidence against a
Cobb-Douglas specification of the model. It thus appears that the marginal rate of
substitution between capital and labor is not constant, and underscoring the complexity of
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the production processes. Rural firms appear less productive than firms in urban locales;
similarly, they pay slightly lower wages than urban firms. Both coefficients appear to reflect
the fact that urban firms operate in environments with more developed factor and product
markets, while rural firms operate in environments where the prices that should serve as
signaling devices for gauging opportunity costs are distorted by informational asymmetry in
the market.
It is also interesting to note that the standard errors of the coefficient estimates are
consistently higher in the production function estimates. This indicates a higher degree of
heterogeneity amongst firms in their productivity than in their wage policies, and is possibly
indicative of the rigidities that collective bargaining agreements continue to impose on a
firm’s wage policy. Alternatively, it could indicate that a functional labor market exists, as
firms have to match the market wage irrespective of their productivity.
Finally, it is instructive to examine the bias that would have arisen had we failed to
account for differences in labor quality in the plant level production functions.20 To this
end, the joint estimation of two such equations is presented in Appendix 3. Interestingly
enough, the bias that arises in the production function generally appears statistically
insignificant. The sole exception is the coefficient for foreign-owned firms, where the
difference is statistically significant according to the Wald test. In this case, the simple
production function predicts a 6 percentage point higher marginal productivity than the
labor-quality augmented one. This upward bias in the simple production function is
consistent with what we would expect given that foreign owned firms tend to employ
relatively more skilled workers than other firms – the failure to account for the superior

20

The magnitude of this bias is particularly informative given that, to the author’s knowledge, no empirical
studies on productivity in transition economies have estimated labor-quality augmented production
functions.
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workforce means that the simple production function overestimates the productivity of
foreign owned firms. The fact that the other coefficients are similar for both production
functions possibly reflects a much more similar demographic labor force composition
between privatized, de novo and state owned firms. If the workforces are similarly
homogeneous across firms of differing ownership types in other countries as well, we can
cautiously conclude that the majority of existing studies on firm productivity in transition
economies have not been severely biased by the omission of labor quality controls in their
empirical models.

Since the data allow us to track the evolution of wage and productivity differentials
from 1992 to 2001, I now present results from cross-sectional regressions identical to the
ones presented in Table 2 that have been estimated for each individual year. Due to the large
number of coefficients estimated, the results are presented in the figures below.
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Figure 2: Estimates of productivity and wage differentials by firm ownership type,
1992 - 2001
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Base group: Cooperatives and firms with mixed or state ownership.
Figure 1 indicates that, apart from a dip in 1994, private and foreign owned firms
have indeed been more productive than state-owned ones, and that foreign-owned firms
have exhibited less variable performance than non-foreign owned firms. The data appear to
support the hypothesis first postulated by Ward (1958) that workers in a worker-managed
firm will engage in rent sharing, thus garnering wages that are higher than their marginal
productivity would warrant. This can be seen by noting that all types of private firms – de
novo, privatized, and foreign-owned – are more productive than the omitted group, stateowned firms, for every year except 1994. Examining the corresponding wage profiles shows
that state-owned firms paid a premium wage relative to privatized and de novo firms, and this
difference posts a sharp decrease as transition progresses. It is also interesting to note that
foreign owned firms are both more productive and tend to pay higher wages; thus,
Slovenian’s traditional mistrust for relinquishing control of their firms to non-Slovenians
appears completely unwarranted.
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Figure 3: Estimates of productivity and wage differentials of women relative to men,
1992 - 2001
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The wage and productivity profiles of women underscores the fact that the transition period
had little effect on women – both profiles appear to remain rather constant relative to men.
Furthermore, although the labor market was highly regulated under socialism, it nevertheless
appeared to operate efficiently.
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Figure 4: Estimates of productivity and wage differentials by age, 1992 - 2001

30-39

1.4

40-49
+50

1.2

1

30-39

1.4

40-49
+50

1.2

1

0.8

0.8

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Year

Year

Base group: Individuals less than 30 years old.
Examining the wage and productivity differentials of workers of various ages reveals
a fascinating dynamic that has evolved during the process of transition: both the relative
wages and marginal productivities of older workers have been consistently decreasing over
this ten year period. Thus, while the oldest group of workers were 37 percent more
productive than the youngest group at the onset of transition, their marginal productivity
was 7 percent lower by 2001; for the second oldest group, their marginal productivity fell
from 19 percent above the youngest group to 10 percent below them by 2001. The drop in
relative wages has been even more dramatic: for the oldest workers, relative wages have
declined from T=1.86 to T=1.13; for the second oldest group, relative wages have fallen from
T=1.38 to T=1.05.21 This dramatic drop in both productivity and wages may be indicative of
a larger, more long-term problem facing transition economies. The drop in the productivity
of older workers may be due to their inability to acquire the knowledge or skills demanded

21
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of workers in a market economy – in other words, just as transition economies have suffered
from obsolete physical capital, they may face the challenge of a workforce whose human
capital has been rendered useless in a market economy.
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Figure 7: Estimates of productivity and wage differentials by education, 1992 - 2001
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Base group: Uncompleted elementary school.
Examining the effects of education on productivity and relative wages over time
illustrates a gradual dispersion in the wage and productivity differential distribution. It also
indicates that individuals with at least 4-year college degrees have witnessed quite substantial
gains in both their relative marginal productivities and wage differentials, while other
educational groups appear to have witnessed a small increase in the dispersion of their wage
differentials relative to the base group, and little change in their relative productivity
differentials. Considering the extreme wage compression under the previous regime,
however, we might have expected a greater increase in wage dispersion (on the other hand,
however, the compressed wage structure appears to have been warranted by the relatively
low marginal productivity of well educated groups in 1992).
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4.) Conclusion
Traditional empirical tests of wage determination theories typically fail to include
direct measures of an individual’s marginal productivity, making it difficult to make robust
conclusions about the wage determination process. Similarly, traditional approaches to
estimating firm productivity across different types of firms typically fail to account for
differences in the quality of a firm’s labor-force, making it difficult to calculate unbiased
productivity measures. The proceeding study overcomes both of these shortcomings by
using matched employer-employee data to jointly estimate plant level production functions
and wage equations. This allows us to make a direct comparison of wage and productivity
differentials across various demographic groups and firm ownership types.
In general, the results indicate that wage and productivity differentials have been
progressively converging over the transition period, indicating that market liberalization is in
fact becoming a reality in Slovenia. Moreover, the results of this study strongly support the
theory that worker appropriation of capital rents in state-owned firms was occurring under
workers’ self-management, and that this phenomenon persisted into the early phase of
transition, as indicated by the discrepancy between the marginal products and the wage
differentials of workers in state-owned firms vis-à-vis their counterparts in privately owned
firms. Foreign owned firms appear to be highly beneficial for the Slovenian economy, as
they are not only significantly more productive than the average firm, but they consistently
pay higher wages as well. The relative productivity of older workers has witnessed a
dramatic fall during the first decade of transition, indicating that older workers are
experiencing difficulty acquiring the skills necessary in a modern capitalist economy. This
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problem may have significant consequences for unwary governments even several decades
down the road, and may prove especially difficult for governments who may need to
increase the retirement age to counter the effects of a generally aging population.
Furthermore, although the discrepancy in the wage and productivity differentials for older
workers has decreased considerably over the first decade of transition, the persisting wage
premium indicates that overly restrictive labor laws and mandated seniority wages may be
hindering productivity growth and weakening the employment prospects of older workers
who are unemployed. In general, however, the regression results indicate that the wage and
productivity profiles in Slovenia across different types of workers and firms are increasingly
approaching a competitive market structure, a development that is especially interesting in
light of Slovenia’s relatively slow pace of structural reform.
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Appendix 1: Comparison of sample employment with actual employment

Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Number of firms in
Total employment in
Number of firms in
Total employment in
matched employer
matched employerinitial firm sample
initial firm sample
employee data
employee data
21046
5973
525600
468717
28,975
8,565
484,350
440,983
32,723
10,411
475,880
431,446
34,997
12,742
485,841
431,407
36,939
13,867
467,851
428,611
37,800
14,956
457,919
423,233
38,454
15,464
455,278
411,712
38,427
15,819
455,594
405,237
38,056
13,850
454,897
365,424
37,210
10,032
457,455
334,928
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia, various years; own tabulations.

Official employment
in formal sector
658922
629,016
605,496
594,394
581,106
593,086
591,653
606,982
615,493
626,444

Percentage of official
employment in
matched employeremployee data
71.1%
70.1%
71.3%
72.6%
73.8%
71.4%
69.6%
66.8%
59.4%
53.5%

Appendix 2: Results from standard log-linear wage regression on individual-level
data
Dependent variable: Log(wages)
Women
-0.13
(0.01)
Completed Elementary School
0.10
(0.002)
Vocational school
0.25
(0.002)
High School
0.54
(0.002)
2-year college
0.89
(0.003)
4-year college
1.22
(0.003)
30-39
0.27
(0.059)
40-49
-0.11
(0.042)
50+
1.07
(0.009)
2-5 years tenure
1.14
(0.009)
5+ years tenure
1.24
(0.009)
Constant
1.04
(0.029)
F-stat
30,621.92
R^2
0.3634
N
1,019,759
Notes: White-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. All the coefficients are significant at the 5 percent
level. Variables included in the regression but excluded from the table include year dummies, industry
dummies, and ownership type dummies.

Matija Vodopivec

Wage and Productivity Differentials in Slovenia

Appendix 3: Joint Estimates of Nonlinear Least Squares Production Function and
Wage Equations, using complete data from 1992-2001 and omitting labor quality
terms
Productive inputs
and competition
control variables

log(Labor)
log(Capital)
(log(Labor))2
(log(Capital))2
log(Labor b Capital)
Overall firm
turnover rate
Herfindahl Index

Firm
Characteristics

De novo (private)
Formerly state
owned (private)
Foreign-owned
Dummy for entry
within current year
Dummy for exit
after current year

Log(Value Added)
(1)
1.15
(0.010)
0.01
(0.008)
0.00
(0.002)
0.02
(0.001)
-0.04
(0.002)
0.37
(0.060)
-0.20
0.04
1.05
(0.009)
1.13
(0.009)
1.30
(0.009)
1.05
(0.030)

Log(Wages)
(2)
1.08
(0.002)
...

p-value, (1) = (2)

...

...

...

...

...

...

-0.07
(0.057)
-0.03
(0.039)
0.66
(0.008)
0.77
(0.008)
1.30
(0.009)
1.02
(0.027)

...

...
...

...
0.00
0.00
0.88
0.43

0.00
0.50
0.67
(0.019)
(0.017)
0.87
0.93
0.00
Rural firm dummy
(0.006)
(0.006)
0.8107
0.8391
2
R
0.8106
0.8391
Adjusted R2
17,949
27,465
F-statistic
109,023
109,023
N
Notes: Standard errors of the estimates are reported in parentheses. The third column presents p-values for
the Wald test for the equality of the corresponding coefficients in that row. Estimates of the intercept are not
reported. The excluded firm type comprises of are cooperatives and firms with mixed or state ownership.
Control variables included in both equations are industry and year dummies.
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